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Engaging  in  exploration  and  exploitation  is  essential  to  business  survival  and  performance. While  
firms  manage exploration and exploitation alliances  for the long-term, how prepared  are they for sudden 
shocks in the short-term? We address this question in the context of a unique and opportune natural 
experiment associated with the 2008 financial crisis. Our analysis of 155 new biopharmaceutical ventures 
over a seven-year period suggests that exploration alliances—with a long-term orientation—make a firm 
more vulnerable to external shocks. In contrast, exploitation alliances  as  well  as  a  balance  between  
exploration  and  exploitation  alliances—which  underlie short-term performance—enable the firm to 
sustain external shocks. 
 
 
Introduction 
The global financial crisis of 2008 contains a 
stark  contrast  between  its  sudden,  unexpected 
onset and its obviousness in retrospect, laid out in 
numerous analyses highlighting its inevitabil- ity.  
This  contrast  has  been  popularized  by  the notion  
of  Black  Swans,  that  is,  unanticipatable events  
with  extreme  impact  that  are  relatively easy   to   
explain   retrospectively   (Taleb   2007). Such  
events  expose  a  significant  rift  between theory  
and  practice  of  business  and  manage- ment.   On   
the   one   hand,   they   are   normally treated as 
unusual events, buried in the extreme but  very  thin  
tails  of  a  presumed  normal  distri- bution   of   
environmental   shocks.   Indeed,   as important  and  
consequential  such  events  may be, they should be 
weighed down by a rational decision-maker given 
the assumed rarity of their occurrence. As such, their 
expected impact is, in theory,  minuscule  and  thus  
relatively  safe  to ignore   by   a   rational   decision-
maker.   On   the other  hand,  in  practice,  their  
actual  impact  is significant, with long-term 
reverberations. More- over,  recent  writings  suggest  
that  economic  cri- ses  occur  much  more  
frequently  than  a  normal 
probability   distribution   would   suggest   (Krug- 
man 2008; Taleb 2007). 
Survival over the long term is a fundamental 
goal  for  firms;  it  looms  large  in  the  evolution 
and change in business environments that chal- 
lenge firms to adapt (Levinthal 1994). However, 
given that the short term of focus of many ven- ture 
capital (VC) backed firms, exit via flotation and/or 
friendly mergers and acquisitions (M&A) based  on  
superior  short-term  performance  may also  
represent  an  attractive  option.  In  view  of this,  
the  literature  has  emphasized  the  impor- tance   
of   engaging   in   both   exploration   and 
exploitation  activities  as  a  means  of  balancing 
short-term  performance  and  long-term  survival 
(March  1991).  This  represents  a  particular  chal- 
lenge   for   new   high-technology   ventures   that 
often  lack  the  resources  to  develop  new  prod- 
ucts and thus keep up with the pace of change 
(Venkataraman  et  al.  1990).  For  such  ventures, 
strategic alliances represent an important mech- 
anism  for  ensuring  innovative  output  (Baum, 
Calabrese,  and  Silverman  2000;  Deeds  and  Hill 
1996).  In  line  with  the  exploration-exploitation 
dilemma,  some  alliances  aim to  exploit  existing
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capabilities,  while  others  aim  to  explore  new 
opportunities  (Koza  and  Lewin  1998;  Lee  et  al. 
2012). Both types of alliances play a vital role in 
sustaining  a  system  of  new  product  develop- 
ment, particularly for smaller firms (Rothaermel and  
Deeds  2004).  However,  given  the  different nature  
of  these  alliances,  the  question  arises  of whether  
and  how  they  matter  for  firm  survival in the face 
of an external economic shock. 
In this paper, we address this question in the 
context   of   a   unique   and   opportune   natural 
experiment  associated  with  the  global  financial 
crisis of 2008, deemed by many the worst since the  
Great  Depression  of  the  1930s.  A  survey  of 
firms conducted in 2006, with no anticipation of 
what  was  to  come,  aimed  to  examine  factors that  
contributed  to  firms’  long-term  prospects. After  
the  crisis,  in  2012,  this  became  an  oppor- tunity  
to  assess  the  survival  of  these  firms  fol- lowing   
this   extraordinary   and   unanticipated short-term  
shock.  We  distinguish  alliances  on the basis of 
their exploration versus exploitation focus,  with  the  
former  focusing  on  longer-term prospects   and   
the   latter   on   more   immediate product  
commercialization  outcomes.  Our  anal- ysis  of  
the  survival  of  155  new  ventures  in  the 
biotechnology   and   pharmaceutical   industries 
over the 2006–2012 period shows that ventures that 
failed had tended to have a higher number of  
exploration  alliances  and  a  lower  number  of 
exploitation alliances. 
Our  work  raises  important  theoretical  and 
managerial questions. First, while current theory on  
firms’  adaptation  to  environmental  changes 
(business   turnaround)   is   concerned   predomi- 
nantly with the  perils  of  long-term survival  and 
the exploratory behavior necessary to overcome it   
(Bourgeois   1981;   Cyert   and   March   1963; 
Lavie,  Kang,  and  Rosenkopf  2011),  our  work 
suggests that short-term disruptions should con- 
stitute  a  more  prominent  angle  in  our  theories. 
Second,  our  work  enhances  the  understanding of  
the  performance  consequences  of  strategic 
behaviors in recession conditions, where market 
selection pressures are less forgiving than those in   
buoyant   conditions.   Our   findings   demon- strate 
that  there  are  distinct resource considera- tions for 
the short term that can help contribute to  the  firm’s  
survival  in  the  wake  of  short-term shocks. 
Finally, while prior work on the balance of  
exploration  and  exploitation  in  alliance  for- 
mation  emphasizes  its  importance  on  the  basis of  
ensuring  long-term  survival,  our  work  sug- gests  
that  short-term  survival  is  an  equally  vital 
consideration.  Additionally,  emphasis  on  long- 
term  strategy  of  biopharmaceutical  firms  over- 
looks   a   more   VC   driven   strategy   that   may 
encourage  early  acquisition  of  the  firm  in  the 
form of trade sale. 
 
Theory and Hypothesis Exploration, 
Exploitation, and Strategic Alliances 
March  (1991,  1995)  links  adaptations  at  firm 
level to changes occurring at the level of the organ- 
izational population through a model of explora- tion  
and  exploitation  in  organizational  learning. He   
described   exploration   as   “experimentation with  
new  alternatives”  having  returns  that  “are 
uncertain, distant, and often negative,” and exploi- 
tation as “the refinement and extension of existing 
competencies,    technologies,    and    paradigms” 
exhibiting  returns  that  “are  positive,  proximate, 
and predictable” (p. 85). However, refining exploi- 
tation more rapidly than exploration may exhaust a 
firm’s opportunities and render its competencies 
obsolete  (March  1991).  The  survival  of  the  firm 
thus depends on its ability to “engage in enough 
exploitation  to  ensure  the  organization’s  current 
viability  and  engage  in  enough  exploration  to 
ensure  its  future  viability”  (Levinthal  and  March 
1993, 105). These two activities are difficult to bal- 
ance  since  exploration  of  new  alternatives  slows 
down the process of exploiting existing ones; and 
improvement  in  competence  at  existing  proce- 
dures  makes  experimentation  with  others  less 
attractive (Levitt and March 1988). 
Exploration–exploitation  choices  are  readily 
applicable   to   strategic   alliances,   defined   as 
voluntarily     initiated     inter-firm     cooperative 
agreements    that     involve     contributions    by 
partners  reflected  in  exchange,  sharing  or  co- 
development of capital, technology, knowledge, or  
other  firm-specific  assets  (Gulati  1995).  A firm’s  
choice  of  the  type  of  alliances  to  enter can  be  
distinguished  by  its  motivation  to  either explore  
for  new  opportunities  or  exploit  exist- ing  
capabilities  (Koza  and  Lewin  1998).  From this  
viewpoint,  exploration  alliances  are  estab- lished  
with  the  motivation  to  discover  some- thing  new  
and  they  focus  on  the  “R”  in  the research  and  
development  process.  They  sup- port  
technological  or  product  innovation  with an 
emphasis on generating new knowledge and social  
capital,  which  allows  the  firm  to  acquire new  
capabilities,  therefore  enhance  its  future viability  
(Koza  and  Lewin  1998;  Levinthal  and March   
1993;   Mowery,   Oxley,   and   Silverman 
1996).  Alternatively,  exploitation  alliances  focus
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on  the  “D”  in  the  research  and  development 
process and are established with the goal to join 
existing    competencies    across    organizational 
boundaries   to   generate   synergies,   which   are 
then  shared  across  the  partners.  They  support 
product  commercialization  with  a  strong  focus on  
leveraging  existing  knowledge  and  relation- ships   
(Deeds   and   Rothaermel   2003),   which allows a 
firm to achieve short-term efficiency by generating      
immediate      benefits,      therefore improving its 
current viability. 
Exploration   and   exploitation   alliances   are 
particularly    prevalent    in    the    biotechnology 
industry (George et al. 2001) and play a  crucial role 
in the process of developing new products (Deeds 
and Hill 1996; Dowling and Helm 2006; Gerwin 
2004; Gilsing and Nooteboomb 2006). It is very 
unlikely for a new venture to possess the necessary  
resources  and  capabilities  to  develop products 
entirely on their own (Amir-Aslani and Negassi  
2006;  Azzone  and  Dalla  Pozza  2003; Tucker, 
Friar, and Simpson 2012), due mainly to their  
liability  of  newness  and  relatively  small size   
(Aldrich   and   Auster   1986;   Stinchcombe 
1965). 
Engagement  in  both  types  of  alliance  activ- 
ities also allows start-up biopharmaceutical firms to 
overcome such liabilities by tapping into part- ners’  
resource  networks  and  making  extensive use of 
their manufacturing facilities, distribution channels 
and customer bases (Fosfuri and Tribo 
2006; Miller 2004; Rothaermel and Deeds 2006). In 
return, large incumbent firms can gain access to 
start-ups’ technologies and make use of their 
external  knowledge  and  expertise  (Diestre  and 
Rajagopalan   2012;   Gilsing   and   Nooteboomb 
2006;    Rothaermel    and    Deeds    2004).    More 
importantly,  exploration   and  exploitation   alli- 
ances  can  provide  the  funding  for  a  start-up  to 
develop its drug to the stage at which an estab- 
lished company deems it worthwhile to acquire it 
even though a commercial drug has yet to be 
generated    (Diestre    and    Rajagopalan    2012; 
McNamara  and  Baden-Fuller  2007).  For  most 
young  biopharmaceutical  companies,  such  alli- 
ances represent their major source of funding in 
addition to equity investments prior to a positive exit  
such  as  IPOs  (Lazonick  and  Tulum  2011; Niosi 
2003). 
In  the  case  of  the  global  financial  crisis  and 
tightening  resources,  access  to  other  sources  of 
funding  such  as  VC  becomes  ever  harder,  spe- 
cifically as the VC sector is increasingly reluctant to 
gamble on  drug  development  projects in the 
hostile  financial  climate  (Baum  and  Silverman 
2004; Dimov and De Clercq 2006; Lazonick and 
Tulum  2011).  The  situation  deteriorates  due  to 
the high risk, capital-intensive nature of the bio- 
pharmaceutical  sector.  To  survive  under  such 
scenarios, start-up biopharmaceutical firms often 
lack  the  resources  necessary  to  contend  with 
major    environmental    shifts    (Roijakkers    and 
Hagedoorn 2006), despite of their strategic flexi- 
bility (Raynor and Leroux 2004), Thus, exploita- 
tion  and  exploitation  alliances  may  provide  an 
attractive  option  to  contend  with  unexpected 
hostile  external  shocks,  as  such  alliances  pro- 
vide start-up biopharmaceutical firms with fund- ing  
or  income  as  well  as  direct  resource  access from  
alliance  partners,  which  can  be  used  to buffer  
the  negative  impact  of  sudden  hostile shocks   
(Hoang   and   Rothaermel   2010;   Meyer 
1982). 
Maintaining  a  balance  between  exploration and 
exploitation is vital for a new venture’s sur- vival 
and prosperity: firms that engage in explo- ration to 
the exclusion of exploitation suffer the costs  of  
experimentation  without  gaining  the benefits    
associated    with    exploiting    extant opportunities,  
and  may  end  up  with  undevel- oped   ideas   and   
missed   opportunities   (March 
1991).  Equally,  firms  that  exploit  to  the  exclu- 
sion  of  exploration  become  trapped  in  subopti- 
mal    equilibrium    which    makes    adaptation 
difficult     as     current     opportunities     become 
exhausted  and  existing  competences  obsolete 
(Levinthal and March 1993). In terms of strategic 
alliances,  new  ventures  that  focus  excessively on 
exploration alliances forgo the opportunities that  
cannot  be  efficiently  tapped  by  its  internal 
organization as a result of limited market access. 
Likewise,  a  new  venture  that  relies  excessively 
on  exploitation  alliances  may  fail  to  internalize 
external  knowledge  that  cannot  be  developed 
internally   (Hagedoorn   1993;   Mowery,   Oxley, 
and  Silverman  1996;  Rothaermel  2001).  Hence, 
an alliance portfolio that excessively emphasizes 
exploration or exploitation is sub-optimal (Hoff- 
mann 2007; Lavie, Kang, and Rosenkopf 2011). The   
two   types   of   alliance   complement   one another  
along  the  firm’s  value  chain  (Rothaer- mel and 
Deeds 2004). 
 
External Shocks 
External  shocks  and  their  impact  on  firms 
have  drawn  the  attention  of  organization  and 
innovation   scholars.   Shepherd,   Douglas,   and 
Shanley  (2000)  define  shocks  as  an  exogenous 
event that alters the overall degree of novelty at a  
point  in  time;  by  contrast,  Venkataraman  and
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Van de Ven (1998) view an external shock as a low   
probability   but   high   consequence   event with  an  
adverse  economic  impact.  The  occur- rence  of  an  
external  shock  is  therefore  difficult to  predict  
and  its  impact  on  firms  is  disruptive and 
potentially inimical. External shocks present both 
danger and opportunities (Starbuck, Greve, and   
Hedberg   1978).   An   external   shock   has direct   
influence   on   the   potential   customers, 
immediately  inhibits  a  new  venture’s  potential 
sales and ways of exit. On the other hand, how- ever,  
new  opportunities  may  be  concomitantly created  
as  the  external  environment  redefines attractive 
market positions  (Meyer,  Brooks,  and Goes 1990). 
External  shocks  dramatically  alter  the  com- 
petitive and operating conditions of an environ- 
ment   (Sine   and   David   2004).   Due   to   their 
liabilities  of  newness  and  relatively  small  size 
(Aldrich  and  Auster  1986;  Stinchcombe  1965), 
new ventures are particularly vulnerable to hos- tile  
external  shocks,  that  is,  those  shocks  that shrink 
the economic opportunities for the popu- lation  of  
ventures  within   an  economic  niche 
(Venkataraman  and  Van  de  Ven  1998).  As  dis- 
cussed already, alliances extend a new venture’s 
boundary so it can  engage in value chain  activ- ities 
that are otherwise unavailable given its lim- ited 
internal resources and market opportunities (Gulati  
1995;  Lavie  and  Rosenkopf  2011).  The resource  
dependency  and  information  process theories 
suggest that the key theoretical motiva- tion  for  
alliances  under  increasing  environmen- tal  
uncertainty  is  to  access  partners’  resources and    
ensure   necessary    knowledge    flows    to reduce  
such  uncertainty  (Combs  and  Ketchen 
1999;  Pfeffer  and  Salancik  1978).  Therefore,  in 
the  face  of  external  shocks,  the  nature  of  the 
venture’s  strategic  alliances  can  be  of  pivotal 
importance for whether a new venture can with- 
stand such shocks. 
On  the  other  hand,  alliances  increase  a  new 
venture’s exposure to uncertainty arising from a 
partner’s future behavior. It may be challenging to  
accommodate  each  partner’s  internal  threat 
rigidity and failing to do so may hinder the joint 
response   to   increasing   environmental   threats 
(Marino et al. 2002). In addition, over-relying on 
partners may lead to power imbalance, in partic- ular 
when a new venture collaborates with large 
established firms. It is more likely that the stron- ger   
partners   will   wield   more   power   which 
increases their potential for opportunism. These 
relational risks are rather predictable and can be 
minimized   as   alliance   relationships   develop. 
Moreover, it is very unlikely that such risks will 
have   an   immediate   life-threatening   effect   on 
each   partner.   In   contrast   to   relational   risks, 
external  shocks  are  unpredictable,  when  they 
coexist, uncertainty at the macro level overrides 
risks at the micro level, as environmental shocks are 
fatal to the vast majority of firms (Shepherd, 
Douglas, and Shanley 2000). Thus it is reasona- ble 
to assume that under sudden hostile shocks, firms’  
needs  to  secure  necessary  resources  and 
information flows will outweigh the fear of rela- 
tional   uncertainty   and   will   encourage   their 
increasing  external  focus  and  alliance  activities 
(Marino et al. 2008). Empirical studies show that 
emerging  market  firms  increasingly  engage  in 
partnership  activities  with  a  purpose  to  cope with 
uncertainty resulting from major economic changes   
(Hitt   et   al.   2004;   Peng   and   Heath 
1996). However, it is likely that external shocks may  
amplify  a  new  venture’s  relational  risks  if the 
firm is overly dependent on one or a set of partners, 
who fail due to external shocks. 
 
Hypotheses 
Prior studies suggest that firms tend to invest 
more  in  exploration  activities  under  perceived 
gradual  shifts  in  the  macro  environment,  as  it 
increases  the  rate  of  innovation  required  for 
longer-term   survival   (Lant   and   Mezias   1992). 
However, focus  on exploration alliances can  be 
detrimental  to  a  new  venture’s  survival  in  the 
wake  of  unexpected  external  shocks  such  as  a 
financial crisis (Jansen, Van Den Bosch, and Vol- 
berda  2006;  Shepherd,  Douglas,  and  Shanley 
2000). Because exploration alliances entail grad- ual 
and continuous investments with a long pay- off    
horizon    and    uncertain    outcomes    (i.e., 
scientific  breakthroughs),  they  are  particularly 
vulnerable  to  the  liquidity  constraints  following a 
financial crisis as such constraints threaten the firm’s  
continued  commitment  to  the  alliances. After  a  
negative  shock,  the  level  of  resource munificence 
is generally lower and a firm’s abil- ity to reduce 
uncertainty in production and mar- ket     is     
significantly     restricted     (Shepherd, Douglas, and 
Shanley 2000). In addition, to the extent that a crisis 
disrupts the current order in the   industry,   the   
long-term   prospects   of   an exploration  alliance  
may be undermined by the degrading  of  the  new  
knowledge  it  generates (Kim and Rhee 2009; 
Levinthal and Posen 2009; Madrid-Guijarro, Garc 
ıa-Perez-de-Lema, and Van Auken  2013).  It  is  
likely  that  more  advanced knowledge   may   come   
out   before   such   new knowledge   has   been   
applied   in   a   specific
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product prototype and finally commercialized in the 
marketplace. 
To deal with such situations, firms may adopt 
retrenchment   strategies,   such   as   terminating 
R&D   projects,   significant   cut   down   of   R&D 
budgets and delay of new product development. 
However, a new product may miss the right tim- ing  
for  its  specific  market  and  fail  to  be  com- 
mercialized    eventually.    Exploration    alliances 
formed  with  the  purpose  of  developing  such 
products  may  collapse  due  to  being  unable  to 
meet  their  anticipated  goals  (Mohr  and  Spek- 
man  1994;  Saxton  1997).  The  cost  of  engaging 
in  undermined  exploration  alliances  and  failing is  
not  recoupable,  and  may  be  greater  than  the cost 
of not pursuing such activities under unex- pected  
external  shocks,  specifically  when  the failure  of  
such alliances carries debt obligations beyond the 
firms’ short term debt paying ability. As a result, 
new ventures that are counterparties to  such  
alliances  may  be  deprived  of  critical funds  that  
sustain  their  ongoing  operations.  In addition,  the  
benefits  of  exploration  alliances such  as  learning  
and  knowledge  accumulation, are  less  imminent  
to  a  new  venture  in  the  face of  a  sudden  hostile  
shock  than  instant  profits, which  have  immediate  
value  to  its  continuous survival in the short-term. 
 
H1: Exploration alliances increase new ventures’ 
likelihood of failure following a hostile exter- nal 
shock. 
 
Exploitation  alliances  focus  on  the  downstream 
activities  of  the  value  chain  (clinical  trials,  FDA 
regulatory  process,  and  marketing  and  sales) with   
a   strong   market   orientation   (Kohli   and 
Jaworski  1990;  Narver  and  Slater  1990).  Invest- 
ment  in  exploitation  alliances  can  make  a  new 
venture  more  resilient  to  immediate  changes  in 
the  business  environment.  Because  firms  with an 
emphasis on marketing  as  opposed  to other 
business   functions   are   more   sensitive   to   the 
impact  of  external  shocks  that  may  potentially 
jeopardize  business  survival,  and  this  enables 
them  to  make  timely  internal  adjustments  to 
counteract   reduction   in   demand   (Pearce   and 
Michael 1997). 
Sudden  hostile  shocks  imply  looming  loss and 
a loss of control over operational decisions and 
outcomes. From a threat-rigidity perspective (Sitkin  
and  Pablo  1992;  Staw,  Sandelands,  and Dutton  
1981),  exploitation  alliances  allow  new ventures  
to  engage  in  risk-averse  activities  by focusing  on  
tried  and  tested competencies  with 
more  predictable  outcomes  that  limit  potential 
loss (Voss, Sirdeshmukh, and Voss 2008). Exter- nal 
shocks can create opportunities for new ven- tures   
with   a   strong   orientation   on   product 
commercialization in their alliance portfolios, as the 
turmoil can make customers dissatisfied and more 
willing to switch suppliers. This can lower the level 
of market uncertainty (e.g., the market entry   
barriers)   for   a   new   venture   and   thus dampen  
its  liability  of  newness  (Stinchcombe 
1965).  In  addition  to  adaptability  to  changes and  
provision  of  new  opportunities,  new  ven- tures  
salvage  their  past  investments  by  exploit- ing   
existing   knowledge   and   leveraging   past 
experience   via   exploitation   alliances.   From   a 
resource-based    perspective,    financial    returns 
achieved  through  exploitation  alliances,  though 
not sustainable in the long run, provide immedi- 
ately available resources that would allow firms to 
act faster in response to unexpected external shocks 
in the short term (Bourgeois 1981; Ham- brick and 
D’Aveni 1988). Thus, the ability to tap into  a  
firm’s  available  resources  is  crucial  not only  to  
cushion  the  sudden  impact  of  a  shock but  also  
to  quickly  capture  the  newly  created 
opportunities  by  the  shock  (Cyert  and  March 
1963). 
 
H2: Exploitation alliances reduce new ventures’ 
likelihood of failure following a hostile exter- nal 
shock. 
 
H1 and H2 naturally raise the question of what 
happens when firms engage in both exploration and 
exploitation. A balance between exploration and 
exploitation alliances may also allow a new venture    
to    adapt    external    shocks    through exploiting   
existing   assets   and   positions   in   a profit   
producing   way   and   simultaneously   to explore 
new technologies and markets. The bal- ance 
enables the new venture to enjoy synergies by   
leveraging   value   chain   complementarities across  
its partners (Lavie and  Rosenkopf 2011). For  
example,  a  new  venture  can  commercialize 
products   by   exploiting   some   of   its   partner’s 
market access and production facilities based on 
knowledge acquired from some of its other part- 
ners.  From  a  resilience  perspective,  a  new  ven- 
ture     becomes     more     robust     through     the 
accumulation of resources generated via exploi- 
tation alliances, which can be used immediately to   
absorb   stress   caused   by   sudden   hostile shocks;  
equally,  exploration  alliances  enhance the  new  
venture’s  capability  to  bounce  back from    these    
shocks    by    transforming    itself
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(Moberg  and  Folke  1999).  Although  achieving 
such  a  balance  is  difficult  due  to  trade-offs  in 
resource allocation and internal conflicts associ- ated  
with the  use  of  inconsistent  organizational 
routines  (Lavie,   Kang,   and   Rosenkopf   2011), 
these  difficulties  may  be  less  applicable  to  new 
ventures.   Given   its   limited   internal   resources 
and reliance on internal value chain activities, a new  
venture  may  depend  on  alliance  partners for both 
exploratory R&D activities and exploit- ative   
marketing   or   production   activities   and become 
more vested in its alliances (Rothaermel and  Deeds  
2004).  In  addition,  a  new  venture enjoys 
sufficient strategic flexibility and is more responsive  
and  agile  when  attempting  to  bal- ance its 
exploration and exploitation efforts, due to its flat 
organizational structure. Accordingly, a new  
venture  would  face  limited  inertial  pres- sures  
when  employing  different  procedures  or adjusting  
its  routines  when  engaging  in  R&D versus   
marketing   or   production   alliances.   Its 
partnering    routines   therefore   become    suffi- 
ciently flexible to enable it to effectively balance 
exploration  and  exploitation  in  alliances  with less 
friction. 
Engagement     with     exploration     alliances 
increases a new venture’s ability to detect trem- ors   
and   prepare   for   external   shocks   (Meyer 
1982). It allows the new venture to capitalize on the  
emerging  opportunities  for  organizational learning  
created  by  the  external  shocks,  and implement  
unrelated  changes  (such  as  the  ter- mination of 
the bad relationships), which makes the firm more 
resilient to external shocks. How- ever,   exploration   
alliances   also   represent   a source  of  risk  to  the  
venture  during  external shocks,  as  the  costs  of  
undertaking  such  activ- ities  can  be  greater  than  
the  profit  they  gener- ate.  Concurrent  engagement  
with  exploitation alliances   can   generate   
immediate   income   or slack  resources  that  can  
be  used  to  buffer  vis- ceral   components,   
safeguard   brittle   linkages, and conserve scarce 
resources which temporally insulates  a  new  
venture  from  external  shocks and fuels adaptive 
responses to them (Cyert and March 1963; Meyer 
1982). 
Overall,  in  facing  an  external  shock  a  firm 
engaging  in  both  exploration  and  exploitation 
alliances would experience the pros and cons of 
each. Given the individual arguments giving rise to  
H1  and  H2,  there  is  no  basis  for  arguing  a 
priori for a particular direction of the combined 
effect  of  engaging  in  exploration  and  exploita- 
tion  alliances.  As  a  result,  we  propose  the  fol- 
lowing set of competing hypotheses: 
 
H3a:   The   balance   between   exploration   and 
exploitation  alliances  reduces  new  ventures’ 
likelihood of failure following a hostile exter- nal 
shock. 
 
 
H3b:   The   balance   between   exploration   and 
exploitation alliances increases new ventures’ 
likelihood of failure following a hostile exter- nal 
shock. 
 
 
Data and Methods 
Original Sample and Data Collection 
We focus on the biopharmaceutical sector in 
particular,  as  past  studies  have  emphasized  the 
importance  of  inter-firm  collaboration  in  new 
product development, and the particularly costly and  
risky  nature  of  this  process  in  biopharma- 
ceutical  firms  (Ernst  and  Young  2006;  Pisano 
1990). The objective of our original data collec- tion 
was to obtain information on the absorptive 
capacity,  open  innovation  activities  and  growth 
of  representative  groups  of  biopharmaceutical 
firms  from  the  U.S.  and  three  major  European 
economies   (i.e.,   France,   Germany,   and   the 
United    Kingdom).    Separate    exercises    were 
undertaken  to  define  target  populations  for  the 
company   survey   in   Europe   and   the   United 
States.  In  the  United  States,  we  obtained  infor- 
mation  on  firms  in  the  broader  biotechnology 
sector from the Bioscan industry directory1  (see also   
Deeds   and   Hill   1996;   Rothaermel   and Deeds 
2004; Zollo, Reuer, and Singh 2002). For 
the  European  economies  the  target  group  was 
based  on  the  data  provided  by  Biotechnology- 
Europe.com2   which  is  the  most  comprehensive 
list   of   firms   in   the   European   biotechnology 
industry. 
Once  a  comprehensive  list  of  biotechnology 
firms had been identified we reviewed each firm’s 
product profile and verified their inclusion in our 
final  list  of  biopharmaceutical  firms.  We  also 
excluded  service  firms  (e.g., consultancies, tech- 
nology transfer organizations, incubator  centers, 
investors  in  biotechnology  companies)  at  this
 
1
BioWorld, Atlanta, Georgia. 
2
Biotechnology World, Warsaw, Poland.
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point as well as organizations that were active in the 
bio-pharmaceutical sector but which were not formal 
legal entities. This resulted in a U.S. target group  of  
999  biopharmaceutical  firms,  and  a European 
target group of 1,099 firms (343 English companies, 
247 French companies, and 509 Ger- man 
companies). 
Once the target groups of biopharmaceutical 
firms  had  been  identified  each  company  was 
approached   by   telephone   to   confirm   contact 
details,  explain  the  purpose  of  this  research, and  
encourage  their  participation  in  the  study. Survey 
design  was  informed  by  inductive  inter- views 
with six R&D managers from five English 
biopharmaceutical     firms.    These    interviews, 
which  lasted  40–90   minutes  each,   helped  to 
clarify key concepts and verify the transparency of 
metrics for absorptive capacity, open innova- tion,  
etc.  Further  verification  of  the  question- naire  
design  was  provided  by  a   pilot  postal survey   
covering   75   Irish   biopharmaceutical companies  
to  pretest  the  initial  design  for  the English 
language questionnaire. Following some minor  
changes  to  the  English  language  ques- tionnaire,   
French  and   German   versions   were developed.   
In  each  case  questionnaires  were cross-translated 
by  two  different translators and any differences in 
meaning were resolved. 
The  main  survey  was  administered  to  the 
final  target list of  2,173 U.S. and  European bio- 
pharmaceutical firms between June and October 
2006.   An   initial   mail   shot   including   freepost 
response  envelopes,  was  followed-up  after  two 
weeks   by   telephone   and   a   further   mailing. 
Finally,  we obtained  useful  responses  from  349 
biopharmaceutical   firms,   an   overall   response 
rate    of    16.1    percent.    Individual    country 
response rates were: United States, 14.4 percent, 
Europe,   17.5   percent   (United   Kingdom,   23.9 
percent,  France,  14.2  percent,  Germany,  14.0 
percent, and Ireland, 22.7 percent). The average 
respondent  firm  had  47  employees,  with  U.S. 
firms being  larger  (average 65  employees) than 
those   in   the   European   Union   countries   (35 
employees). 
 
 
The Natural Experiment Afforded by the global 
financial crisis of 2008 
As  a  hostile  exogenous  shock  that  is  widely 
acknowledged   as   the   worst   since   the   Great 
Depression  of  the  1930s  (Haidar  2012;  Reuters 
2008),  the  2008  global  financial  crisis  provides 
an   ideal   natural   experiment   to   examine   our 
research questions (Chakrabarti, Singh, and Mah- 
mood  2007;  Wan  and  Yiu  2009).  Brewing  for  a 
while, the crisis started to show its effects in the 
middle of 2007 and into 2008. As shown in Fig- ure  
1,  the  GDP  growth  of  the  four  study  coun- tries  
dropped  significantly  and  plunged  to  the 
historically  lowest  points  in  the  first  quarter  of 
2008. Though a sharper rise was seen in the fol- 
lowing   period,   cresting   around   mid-2009,   the 
growth   rates   of   all   four   economies   slowly 
declined   again   soon   afterward.   This   trend   is 
closely mirrored by the stock value of the global 
biotechnology industry: for example, a significant 
drop in the NASDQ Biotechnology Index can be 
clearly  identified  between  September  2008  and 
March 2009 (Figure 2).
 
 
Figure 1 
GDP Growth between 2006 and 2012 Q1 by Country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank.
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Figure 2 
NASDAQ Biotechnology Index (NBI) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: NASDAQ. 
 
The  2007–2008  financial  crisis  played  a  sig- 
nificant  role  in  the  failure  of  major  businesses, 
decline in consumer wealth estimated in trillions of  
U.S.  dollars,  and  a  downturn  in  economic 
activity  leading  to  the  2008–2012  global  reces- 
sion and contributing to the European sovereign debt   
crisis   (Baily   and   Elliott   2009;   Williams 
2012). The resulting “credit crunch” significantly 
slowed   VC   fundraising   for   technology-based 
start-ups  such  as  new  biopharmaceutical  ven- 
tures since 2007 (British Venture Capital Associ- 
ation   [BVCA]   2009;   National   Venture   Capital 
Association [NVCA] 2009; World Bank 2009), as 
investors  became  more  cautious  in  committing 
money  to  VC  funds.  The  following  recession 
impacted  sales  growth  for  many  start-ups,  the 
timeline  to  profitability,  and  hence  amount  of 
funding   required.   In  the   meantime,   the   eco- 
nomic  downturn  provided  cost  effective  oppor- 
tunities    to    invest    in    new    or    disruptive 
technologies   spinning   out   from   the   science 
base. The booming clean energy investment and 
associated high level of  investor enthusiasm for the  
sector  provide  some  evidence  to  support this 
proposition (Makower, Pernick, and Wilder 
2007). 
We  examine  only  the  period  of  the  global 
financial  crisis  in  this  study  for  several  reasons. 
First,  the  global  financial  crisis  created  a  series 
of subsequent shocks such as the follow on eco- 
nomic  crisis,  as  well  as  changes  in  government 
spending,  regulations,  and  financial  availability, 
etc.  We  separate  them  from  the  financial  crisis 
itself,  as  the  effects  of  these  subsequent  shocks 
are dramatic and still ongoing at the time of our 
study.   Second,   capital-raised  declined   sharply 
during  the  crisis  period  as  a  result  of  a  sharp 
rise  in  the  equity  risk  premium  (the  risk  pre- 
mium  of  equities  over  bonds),  causing  the  cost 
of  capital  to  rise  and  private  investment  to  fall. 
Biotechnology  companies  in  the  United  States 
and  Europe  raised  US$16  billion  in  2008,  a  46 
percent  decline  from  2007.  IPO  funding  fell  95 
percent  to  US$116  million  (Ernst  and  Young 
2009).   This   systemic   and   protracted   funding 
drought  placed  the  business  model  that  fueled 
biotech growth for the past three decades under 
unprecedented  strain.  To  survive  in  this  envi- 
ronment,  firms  may  need  to  restructure  opera- 
tions  and  use  deals  creatively,  as  well  as  bring 
the  creativity  that  has  long  been  the  industry’s 
hallmark  to  establishing  more  durable  models for  
funding  innovation,  for  example,  via  more 
creative development partnerships. 
We  focus  on  new  ventures  within  our  origi- 
nal sample, defined as those less than ten years
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old  at  the  time  of  the  crisis  (Certo,  Daily,  and 
Dalton  2001;  Covin  and  Slevin  1990;  Shepherd 
1999; Sigmund, Semrau, and Wegner 2015). We 
consider  this  as  appropriate  in  the  context  of our 
study as it usually takes at least ten years for a  
biopharmaceutical  company  to  bring  a  new drug  
from  discovery  to  FDA  approval—a  time horizon 
that captures the transition from a new venture to an 
established business. This yielded a final sample of 
155 new ventures out of a list of  349  
biopharmaceutical  firms  included  in  the original  
sample.  We  collected  further  informa- tion  on  
their  latest  survival  status  in  2012  from 
FAME3  (for  the  United Kingdom)  and Thomson 
ONE4  (for France and Germany) using the com- 
pany name identifiers. For respondent firms that 
could  not  be  identified  in  these  two  databases, 
we collected the survival information from their 
official   websites   and/or   industry   newspapers 
such  as  Healthcare  Industry  Today5   and  Bio- 
Portfolio.
6    
These  data  sources  also  helped  us 
gather  the  latest  information,  for  the  firms  that 
did survive the crisis, on their product portfolio, in  
particular  the  number  of  new  product(s)  on the  
market.  Table  1  summarizes  the  observa- tions  
and  key  variables  in  each  of  the  three countries  
and  the  overall  sample.  In  terms  of the  
nonresponse  bias, no  significant differences are 
found between respondent and nonrespond- ent   
firms   on   firm   size   (p 5 0.35)   and   age (p 5 
0.67). 
 
Survival Time 
We study the survival time from initial estab- 
lishment  until  failure.  The  event  of  interest  is 
firm exit by bankrupcy or liquidation (coded as 
1). Exit by M&A is a competing event (coded as 
2).  From  an  investor  and  entrepreneur’s  view- 
point,  being  acquired  and/or  merged  is  often 
viewed as  success rather than  failure given  that a  
business  is  sold  at  or  above  its  market  value, 
because  successful  sale  of  the  business  allows 
investors   and   entrepreneurs   to   harvest   from 
their  investment.  Specifically, during  the  period of  
the  crisis,  when  world  stock  markets  have been  
depressed,  trade  sales  are  usually  consid- ered  as  
more  desirable  exit  routes  than  flota- tions 
(Storey and Greene 2010). This has led to 
acceleration  of  consolidation  of  the  global  bio- 
technology industry (Ernst and Young 2009). As 
firms are at risk of failing all the time, to exam- ine 
the net effect of the global financial crisis on firm  
survival,  we  split  each  firm’s  observation spell  
into  three,  with  the  dividing  lines  repre- senting 
the onset and end of the global financial crisis  
respectively.  In  this  specification,  the  sec- ond  
observation  spell,  during  of  the  crisis,  rep- 
resents    the    heightened    hazard    of    failure 
triggered  by  the  external  economic  shock.  The 
first and last observation spells capture firm sur- 
vivability  before  and  after  the  crisis.  Since  the 
exact  dates  of  exit  were  not  precisely  recorded 
in the database but the months were, we chose the 
month of exit as our time variable. 
We  used  September  2008  as  the  onset of  the 
global  financial  crisis  for  the  purpose  of  this 
study, as according to the World Bank and NAS- 
DAQ  official  statistics,  this  was  the  time  when 
the  GDP  growth  of  all  our  four  study  countries 
plunged into the undergrowth (Figure 1) and the 
market value of  the global  biotechnology  indus- 
try begun to collapse below the historically low- est  
point  since  2006  (Figure  2).  Equally,  June 
2009  was  considered  as  the  end  of  most  severe 
period   of   the   crisis   (Hulbert   2010),   as   GDP 
growth   for   the   four   countries   in   ours   study 
climbed to its highest level since the onset of the 
crisis  at  this  point  (Figure  1),  after  which  the 
growth of the market value of the global biotech- 
nology industry took off (Figure 2). Unless firms 
failed  before  September  2008,7    the  first  spells 
were  right  censored  and  the  actual  outcomes 
were shown in the second spells, which capture 
whether   the   firms   in   the   study   survived   the 
global  financial  crisis.  The  last  spells  comprise 
those  firms  survived  beyond  the  financial  crisis. 
This  organization  of  the  data  yielded  a  total  of 
430 observations (12 firms failed before Septem- ber 
2008 1 143 firms 3 2 periods 1 132 firms). 
 
Model Specification 
We estimate the hazard rate using a compet- 
ing   risk   model   (CRM)   (Han   and   Hausman 
1990),  as  two types  of  exit forms are  examined in 
this study, namely firm failure (bankruptcy or 
liquidation)  and  M&A.  The  model  is  based  on
 
3
Bureau Van Duk, Brussels. 
4Thomson Reuters. New York. 
5IPD Group, Washington, D.C. 
6
Bioportfolio, Dorset, UK. 
7
In our case, we found 12 such firms that failed between January 2006 and September 2008.
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Fine and Gray’s proportional hazard model and thus  
does  not  require  any  restrictive  assump- tions  
regarding  the  baseline  hazard,  such  as  a Weibull  
or  lognormal  specification.  This  allows us  to  
account  for  the  mode  of  exit  in  terms  of 
bankruptcy  or  liquidation  and  M&A.  The  two 
outcomes are treated as independent so that the 
probability of the occurrence of one is assumed not  
to  depend  on  the  probability  of  the  occur- rence  
of  another.
8   
Thus,  the  discrete  time  for- 
mulation of the hazard of exit type j for firm i at 
duration  t  is  denoted  as  ht   
 
Xijt 
   
and  can  be 
given  by  a  complementary  log  logistic  function 
as follows: 
biopharmaceutical   firm’s   value   chain,   that   is, 
basic research, drug discovery, preclinical devel- 
opment.  Exploitation  alliances  are  a  count  vari- 
able of marketing based partnerships that focus on  
downstream  activities,  that  is,  clinical  trials, FDA  
regulatory  process,  marketing,  and  sales. In  
industries  like  the  biopharmaceuticals,  alli- ance   
activities   are   widely   observed   (George et  al.  
2001),  and  are  seen  as  playing  an  impor- tant  
role  in  contributing  to  the  survivability  of new 
ventures (Dowling and Helm 2006; Gilsing and 
Nooteboomb 2006). 
 
Balance  Between  Exploraton  and  Exploitation 
Alliances.    We  measure  the  balance  betweenn                                 o
ht 
 
Xijt 
 
512exp    2exp   X0it bj 1dj ðtÞ  (1) 
exploraton  and  exploitation  alliances  by  adopt- 
ing the approach to measuring firm ambidexter-
 
where j 5 1 or 2, depending on the type of exit 
(bankruptcy  or  liquidation  versus  M&A);  i 5 1, 
.. .,  n;  t 5 1,  .. .,  T.  dj ðtÞ  is  the  baseline  hazard 
function  relating  to  the  hazard  rate  ht   
 
Xijt 
   
at 
the  tth  interval  with  the  spell  duration  (Jenkins 
1995).  It  is  assumed  to  take  the  proportional 
form  as  dj ðtÞ5  d0ðtÞ   X’itbj ,  where  d0ðtÞ  is  the 
baseline function, bj  is a vector of the regression 
parameters  and   Xit    is   a   vector   of   covariates 
for  firm  (i).  The  vector  Xit    in  our  empirical 
model includes a range of time varying explana- tory  
variables  relating  to  the  factors  affecting firm  
survival,  that  is,  number  of  exploration  or 
exploitation  alliances,  and  the  global  financial 
crisis.  It  also  includes  control  variables  relating 
to   the   firm   characteristics   (such   as   age   and 
R&D    intensity)    and    strategic    focus.    These 
explanatory  variables  are  effectively  measured 
with  a  six-year  lag  with  respect  to  the  depend- 
ent variable, since they were collected in the ini- tial  
survey  in  2006  and  firm  survival  status  is 
updated  in  2012.  Each  of  the  factors  associated 
with firm survival is explained in more detail as 
follows. 
 
Measures 
Exploration  and  Exploitation  Alliances.    We 
measure  exploration  and  exploitation  alliances in   
which   a   biopharmaceutical   firm   engages along  
its value  chain  (Deeds  and Hill 1996;  Xia and  
Roper  2008).  Exploration  alliances  are  a count  
variable  of  research  based  partnerships 
which    focus    on    upstream    activities    in    a 
ity  of  exploratory  and  exploitative  innovation, 
that is, as a multidimensional construct compris- ing 
the  non-substitutable  combination of  explo- ration  
and  exploitation  alliances  (Gibson  and Birkinshaw   
2004;   Jansen,   Simsek,   and   Cao 
2012).  In  practice,  firm  ambidexterity  is  opera- 
tionalized   as   the   multiplicative   interaction   of 
exploration   and   exploitation   activities   (Cao, 
Gedajlovic, and Zhang 2009; Gibson and Birkin- 
shaw  2004;  He  and  Wong  2004;  Lavie,  Kang, 
and Rosenkopf 2011), as high levels of explora- tion 
and exploitation complement  and augment the 
performance enhancing effect of each other (Cao, 
Gedajlovic, and Zhang 2009; Jansen, Sim- sek,  and  
Cao  2012).  To  address  the  facts  that the  simple  
multiplicative  term  is  very  sensitive to the  total  
number of  alliances and  that it  fails to account for 
the balance itself (e.g., 2 3 8 gives the  same  
multiplicative  score  as  4  3  4),  we divide  the  
multiplicative  term  by  the  square  of the  average  
number  of  exploration/exploitation alliances. The 
intuition for this is that for a given total   number   of   
alliances,   the   multiplicative score  is  highest  
when  the  numbers  of  explora- tion  and  
exploitation  alliances  are  equal.  Our measure thus  
ranges  between 0  and  1  and rep- resents the raw 
multiplicative score as a propor- tion  of  its  
maximum  for  the  given  number  of alliances.  In  
the  earlier  examples,  for  alliance numbers of 2 
and 8, the balance measure yields a value of 0.64 
(i.e., 2 3 8/52), while for alliance numbers of 4 and 4, 
the balance measure yields a  value  of  1.  We  note,  
however,  that  using  the
 
8To test whether these two exit types can be treated as independent, we performed a Hausman test and a Wald-test of 
equality for all parameters. The results from both tests confirmed the significant differences between these two forms of 
exit.
 simple multiplicative term yields results consist- ent 
with those reported below. 
 
Global Financial Crisis. To capture the impact of the 
global financial crisis on the likelihood of firm 
survival,  we  included  a  crisis  dummy  variable 
reflecting  the  period  during  the  global  financial 
crisis between September 2008 and June 2009 (1 
respresents the survival period between Septem- ber 
2008 and June 2009 and 0 otherwise). 
 
Control variables.    In addition to the main var- 
iables  of  interest,  we  control  for  a  number  of 
other possible effects as captured by various rel- 
evant firm characteristics such as age, size, R&D 
intensity,  location,  strategic  focus,  and  funding 
profile.  We  control  for  firm  age  (measured  in 
years), as new ventures typically suffer from the 
liabilities of newness and the risks of failure are 
higher for young firms than older firms (Stinch- 
combe 1965). Competing arguments based on a 
liability  of  adolescence,  however,  suggest  that the   
risk   of   failure   is   relatively   low   for   very 
young firms due to support by external constitu- ents  
and  initial  endowments.  But  when  these initial  
resources  become  depleted,  the  failure hazard  
shoots  up  and  then  declines  following the  
liabilities  of  newness  pattern  (Bruderl  and 
Schussler 1990). 
We  measure  size  by  a  firm’s  number  of  full- 
time  employees.  According  to  Penrose’s  theory 
of  growth  (1959),  if  a  firm  grows  too  fast  by 
size, the entrepreneur or the management team of the 
firm may not be able to respond quickly enough   
and   make   necessary   changes   to   the 
organization   and   management   structure.   The 
resulting mismatch  between  firm size and  man- 
agement  structure  may  put  the  firm  at  risk  of 
going  bankrupt and  lead  to firm  exit  (Churchill 
and Lewis 1983). 
R&D  intensity  is  measured  by  the  average 
percentage of R&D investment to total turnover 
for  each  firm  during  the  last  three  years  at  the 
time  of  the  survey  (Deeds  2001;  Fontana  and 
Nesta  2009).  Firms  investing  in  R&D  activities 
are   more   likely   to   generate   new   knowledge 
stocks and improved productivity growth which will  
increase  the  market  value  of  the  firm,  and 
consequently   the   likelihood   of   survival   (Hall 
1987).  In  knowledge-intensive  industries  such as   
biopharmaceuticals,   a   significant   strategic 
commitment  to  R&D  appears  to  be  critical  to 
the    firm’s    ability    to    develop    competencies 
required  to  survive  and  succeed  (Deeds  2001). 
However,   over-capitalizing   in   R&D   activities 
(above  the  optimal  level  of  R&D)  is  risky  to  a 
firm’s continuous survival, as it increases uncer- 
tainty. Higher uncertainty generates a temporary 
slowdown  and  bounceback  as  firms  postpone 
activity   and   wait   for   uncertainty   to   resolve 
(Bloom et al., 2007). This significantly reduces a 
firm’s   responsiveness   of   R&D   to   changes   in 
business  conditions,  such  as  major  economic 
shocks.  New  establishments  generally  operate 
below  the  optimal level  of R&D with no  access to 
large R&D facilities (e.g., large R&D laborato- ries)  
unless  through  external  partners  such  as large 
corporates and public research institutions 
(Mahmood and Mitchell, 2004). In addition, it is 
very  unlikely  for  a  start-up  biopharmaceutical 
firms  to  attract  massive  initial  VC  investment  in 
basic R&D without staging, due to the high attri- 
tion  rate  and  prolonged  process  of  biopharma- 
ceutical product development. 
Next, as there may be significant institutional or  
environmental  effects  we use a  dummy  vari- able 
to control for European Union–United States 
differences    (0 5 United    States,    1 5 European 
Union)  (Rothaermel  and  Deeds  2006).  We  also 
control  for  new  ventures  access  to  VC  funding, 
which  may  make  a  critical  difference  to  their 
engagement with exploration or exploitation alli- 
ance  activities.  Firms  backed  by  VC  are  more 
likely to capitalize on exploitation alliance activ- ity 
and survive better, because they can call upon 
sufficient resources to pursue exploration activity 
(Niosi 2003). The variable takes a value of 1 if a 
new venture receives external funding from ven- 
ture capitalists, and 0 otherwise. Finally, the stra- 
tegic focus of biopharmaceutical firm represents an 
important factor for their survival and growth (i.e.,  
Deeds  and  Hill  1996;  George  et  al.  2001; 
Maurer  and  Ebera  2006).  We  measure  this  firm 
characteristic by two indicator variables, reflect- ing, 
respectively, whether a firm focuses on pre- clinical 
development and marketing and sales. 
Since  our  survey  firms  are  relatively  small 
companies in an emerging sector, there were no 
consistent   secondary   data   sources   that   could 
provide  an  objective  corroboration  of  some  of 
the    individual    responses.    Nevertheless,    we 
sought  to  minimize  common  method  bias  by 
guaranteeing  response  anonymity,  counterbal- 
ancing  the  question  order  and  structuring  the 
questionnaire  to  seperate  the  measurements  of 
predictor   and   criterion   variables   (Podsakoff et  
al.  2003).  In  addition,  we  conducted  a  Har- 
man’s  single-factor  test  of  all  variables  in  this 
study. Exploratory factor analysis shows a result of  
seven  factors  with  eigenvalues  greater  than
 
 
 
12                                        
XIA AND DIMOV 13  
one  with  the  first  factor  accounting  for  only  12 
percent  of  the  total  variance.  Independent  and 
dependent  variables  of  each  of  our  equations 
clearly loaded on different factors. These results 
indicate  that  common  method  bias  is  not  sub- 
stantially present in our data. 
 
Results 
Tables 2 and 3 report the descriptive statistics 
and  correlations  for  the  variables  used  in  our 
analysis.  Table  4  reports  the  results  from  CRM 
of firm failure. Model 1 includes the control vari- 
ables  as  well  as  the  main  effects  for  the  crisis 
and the numbers of exploration and exploitation 
alliances.  In  Model  2,  we  add  the  interaction 
effects  of  the  alliance  variables  with  the  crisis 
dummy.  These  interaction  effects  represent  the 
effects  of  exploration  and  exploitation  alliances 
on  firm  failure  after  the  onset  of  the  financial 
crisis.  In  Models  3  and  4,  we  include  the  effect 
of balance between exploration and exploitation 
alliances  and  then  its  interaction  with  the  crisis 
dummy, to test H3a and H3b. 
In terms of main effects of the alliance varia- 
bles, in Model 1 we find the effect for crisis to be 
positive  and  marginally  significant  (b 5 0.328, p < 
.10),  indicating—as  one  would  expect—that the 
risk of failure increases after the onset of the crisis.  
The  effect  of  the  number  of  exploration alliances  
is  positive  and  marginally  significant (b 5 0.041, p 
< .10), while the effect of exploita- tion  alliances  is 
negative and  marginally  signifi- cant (b 5 20.043, p 
< .10). These results suggest
 
Table 2 
Basic Descriptives by Exit Type 
 
Variable                                              Survival                Exita                              M&Ab                           Bankrupt and 
liquidationb 
 
N 5 125                   N 5 30                 N 5 19                    N 5 11 
 
Mean     S.D.      Mean      S.D.      Mean      S.D.       Mean         S.D. 
 
 
No. of exploitation alliances      2.19      7.87      2.58         5.36      3.25        6.49       1.50           2.76 
No. of exploration alliances       2.66      3.72      3.79         4.67      4.44        5.52       2.60           2.32 
Alliance balance                           0.30      0.42      0.29*       0.40      0.32        0.44       0.24           0.35 
Sales growth                                 0.93      1.75      0.75         0.98      0.76        0.74       0.71           1.56 
Firm characteristics 
R&D intensity                               0.57      0.30      0.59         0.36      0.61        0.33       0.54           0.44 
No. of employees                      18.00    20.20    31.00**    31.04    37.001      36.65     20.001           13.34 
Firm age (by 2006)                      6.19      2.16      6.53         2.18      6.47        2.25       6.64           2.16 
Market focus 
Regional market                           0.81      0.40      0.76         0.44      0.74        0.45       0.80           0.42 
Foreign market                             0.45      0.50      0.59**      0.50      0.53        0.51       0.70           0.48 
External market                            0.28      0.45      0.33         0.48      0.32        0.48       0.36           0 .50 
Strategic focus
Primary activity: R&D and 
preclinical dev. 
Primary activity: marketing 
and sales 
0.74      0.44      0.77         0.43      0.74        0.45       0.82           0.40 
 
0.48      0.50      0.23**      0.43      0.26        0.45       0.18           0.40
VC funding                                    0.55      0.50      0.66         0.48      0.58        0.51       0.80           0.42 
 
 
a
Comparison between survival and exit firms. 
b
Comparison between firms experienced bankrupt and liquidation and M&A. 
1p < .1 
*p < .05 
**p < .01
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Table 4 
Competing Risk Regression of New Venture Failure 
Dependent variable: Exit by bankruptcy or 
liquidation 
Model (1)    Model (2)    Model (3)    Model (4) 
 
Coef.                 Coef.             Coef.             Coef.
 
Crisis dummy                                                                 0.256
1                
0.608
1                
0.222
1                
0.264
1
 
No. of exploration alliances                                        0.0441                0.0181 
No. of exploitation alliances                                    20.0371           20.0521 
No. of exploration alliances 3 crisis dummy                                 0.0021 
No. of exploitation alliances 3 crisis dummy                             20.970* 
Alliance balance                                                                                                      20.5041           20.158** 
Alliance balance 3 crisis dummy                                                                                              22.014** 
Controls 
Firm characteristics 
R&D intensity                                                             21.7031           21.831*        21.5581           21.5021 
Firm age                                                                         0.121*           0.127*           0.119*           0.118* 
No. of employees                                                       20.015          20.016             0.119         20.012 
VC funding                                                                     0.849             0.743             0.834             0.805
Nationality (European Union 5 1/United 
States 5 0) 
Strategic focus 
0.148             0.211          20.149             0.162
Preclinical dev.                                                              0.372             0.361             0.366             0.387 
Marketing and sales                                                  21.1951           21.6391           21.0551           21.0441 
 
 
1p < .1 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
N 5 298. 
 
 
 
that  engagement  in  exploration  alliances  has  a 
negative   impact   on   firm   survival,   whereas 
engagement in exploitation alliances has a posi- tive 
impact. In Model 3, the main effect for bal- ance    
between    exploration    and    exploitation alliances 
on the likelihood of failure is negative and 
marginally significant (b 5 20.464, p < .01), 
suggesting that this balance has a positive impact on 
survival. 
The  interaction  effects  of  the  numbers  of 
exploration  and  exploitation  alliances  and  the 
balance  between  them  with  the  crisis  dummy 
enhance the just described main effects in each case.  
In  Model  2,  the  interaction  between  the number  
of  exploration  alliances  and  the  crisis dummy  is  
positive  and  marginally  significant (b 5 0.002,  p < 
.10).  It  suggests  that  engaging in  exploration  
alliances  leads  to  even  higher likelihood  of  
failure  after  the  onset  of  the  cri- sis.  This  result  
provides  some  support  for  H1. 
The    interaction    between    the    number    of 
exploitation  alliances  and  the  crisis  dummy  is 
negative  and  significant  (b 5 20.972,  p < .05). It  
suggests  that  engaging  in  exploitation  alli- ances 
leads to much lower likelihood of failure after  the  
onset  of  the  crisis.  This  result  sup- ports  H2.  
Finally,  in  Model  4,  the  interaction effect  of  the  
balance  between  exploration  and exploitation  
alliances  and  the  crisis  dummy  is negative  and  
significant  (b 5 22.241,  p < .01). It suggests that 
maintaining a balance between the  two  types  of  
alliance  leads  to  lower  likeli- hood  of  failure  
after  the  onset  of  the  crisis. This  result  provides  
some  support  for  H3a. Thus, H3b is rejected. 
 
Robustness Checks 
To  verify  the  robustness  of  our  results,  we 
performed  several  additional  analysis.  First  as we    
focus    on    two    types    of    exit,    failure
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(bankruptcy  or  liquidation)  and  M&A,   which can  
be  treated  as  categorical  outcomes,  we  re- 
estimated the previously examined relationships 
using an alternative multinominal logistic regres- 
sion  without  separating  the  net  effect  of  the 
global  financial  crisis.  The  results  suggest  very 
similar patterns to the CRM in Table 4. 
Second, an M&A can be a successful exit if it is 
valued well for the acquired company. However, it 
can also be an  indication  of  firm failure if the 
M&A is hostile or extremely low-valued, and the 
acquired company has to sell with little bargaining 
power.  To  rule  out  this  type  of  M&A  from  our 
analysis,  we  have  checked  the  M&A  profiles  of 
our respondent firms by looking for information on 
their valuations from various secondary sour- ces, 
such as company websites, industry reports, business 
news and commentary. Our finding con- firms  that  
all  the  19  M&A  deals  included  in  our estimation 
are successful exits. 
Third,  to  test  whether  the  two  forms  of  exit 
examined  in  this  study  can  be  treated  as  inde- 
pendent event, we estimated the hazard of each form  
of  exit  using  a  Cox  proportionate  model, and  
performed  a  Hausman  test  of  the  differen- ces  
between  these  two  outcomes.  The  results confirm  
the  significant  differences  between  exit by 
bankruptcy or liquidation (failure) and M&A. 
Fourth,  we  performed  a  robustness  check  on 
the    consistency    between    our    sample    firms’ 
engagement with both types of alliances and their 
overall  explorative  and/or  exploitative  strategy.9 
The  results  show  that  our  sample  firms,  engage- 
ment  with  exploration  alliances  is  highly  corre- 
lated  with  their  overall  focus  on  the  explorative 
dimension   (b 5 0.787,   p < .01);   likewise   these 
firms’  engagement  with  exploitation  alliances  is 
highly  correlated  with  an  overall  focus  on  the 
exploitative dimension (b 5 0.706, p < .01). As an 
extension  of  this  analysis,  we  have  included  a 
variable   capturing   the   ratio   of   exploration   to 
exploitation  alliances  in  our  estimation  of  new 
venture failure. The result confirms that the share of 
effort toward exploratory activity in a new ven- 
ture’s alliance portfolio is a significant predictor of 
its failure under external shocks.10 
Fifth,  to  test  the  sensitivity  of  our  results  to 
the choice of period for the global financial cri- sis, 
we conducted further analysis of our sample 
firms’   likelihood   of   failure   during   the   years 
within   and   following   the   crisis.   The   results 
obtained  in  each  year  are  consistent  with  our 
current results. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that firms 
with  more  exploitation  alliance  activities  at  the 
time  of  our  initial  survey  in  2006  would  natu- 
rally expect to be more advanced in their inno- 
vation.  They  are  more  likely  to  have  products 
nearer  to  market,  which  will  make  it  easier  for 
such   firms   to   obtain   funding   and   therefore 
increase their likelihood of survive during exter- 
nal   shocks.   To   test   this   potential   effect,   we 
included   a   count   variable   capturing   a   firm’s 
number  of  products  at  late  stage  development in  
our  estimation.  The  results  confirm  that  the 
possession  of  products  nearer  to  market  does 
not   have   a   significant   effect   on   our   sample 
firms’  likelihood  of  failure   during  the  global 
financial crisis. 
 
Discussion 
Our aim in this paper has been to gain some 
understanding  of  how  alliance  behavior  relates to   
new   venture   survival   under   extraordinary and 
unanticipated short-term shocks. We did so in  the  
context  of  the  global  financial  crisis  of 
2008,  which  afforded  a  natural  experiment  for 
the  paper.  The  empirical  results  suggest  that 
exploration  alliances,  that  is,  those  focused  on 
longer-term  product  development,  make  firms 
more vulnerable to external shocks in the short term.  
In  contrast,  exploitation  alliances,  that  is, those  
aimed  at  leveraging  existing  knowledge and   
competencies,   enable   firms   to  withstand such  
shocks  and  thus  ensure  their  short-term survival. 
Similarly, balancing both types of activ- ities  also  
enhances  the  likelihood  of  new  ven- ture  survival  
in  the  short  term.  A  number  of implications are 
identified as follows. 
First,  our  study  provides  new  insights  into the  
relationship  between  exploration  alliances and   
firms’   performance   outcomes.   Previous 
research has shown that firms using exploration 
alliances  to  identify  market  opportunities  have 
higher   performance,   and   this   relationship   is 
stronger both in unstable external environments and   
for   smaller   start-up   firms  (Marino  et  al. 
2008;  Sarkar,  Echambadi,  and  Harrison  2001).
 
9We  operationalized  firms’  overall  focus  on  the  explorative  and  exploitative  dimensions  in  terms  of  two 
dummy variables (1 stands for a focus on explorative or exploitative dimension, 0 otherwise). In the original sur- vey, we 
ruled out those firms whose overall focus was neither explorative nor exploitative dimensions. 
10The results are available upon request.
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Our  finding  of  a  negative  relationship  between 
exploration  alliances  and  firm  survival  suggests 
that  engaging  in  exploration  alliances  jeopard- 
izes a new venture’s survival under sudden hos- tile  
external  shocks  such  as  the  global  financial 
crisis.  In  other  words,  exploring  new  products 
contributes    to    the    biopharmaceutical    firm’s 
future  success,  however,  at  the  expense  of  its 
current  viability.  Moreover,  we  explicitly  focus 
on  an  unexpected  external  shock  in  this  study. 
Such shocks are rarely considered in theoretical 
accounts   of   firm   survival   and   absent   in   the 
empirical  literature  as  they  are,  by  definition, 
unusual   and   unexpected.   Successful   strategy 
adaptation  assumes  knowing  what  the  future 
business  environment  will  look  like,  however, the  
unpredictable  and  instant  nature  of  such shocks  
makes  it  hard  to  envisage  and  prevent firms  
from  making  prompt  adjustments.  But  to the   
extent   that   they   are   more   prevalent—as recent   
work   suggests   (Krugman   2008;   Taleb 
2007)—our  work  suggests  that  long-term,  risky 
endeavors  such  as  exploration  alliances  should be 
complemented by initiatives to maintain firm 
viability in the short-term. 
Second,   our   study   articulates   the   role   of 
exploitation  alliances  as  a  compelling  strategy for  
enduring  survival.  Previous  studies  suggest that  
exploitation  alliances  prevent  firms  from 
discovering new opportunities  and reduce  their 
future viability in  the  buoyant  conditions (Koza 
and  Lewin  1998;  March  1991).  However,  the 
short-term   performance   benefits   of   such   alli- 
ances  have  been  largely  overlooked,  given  that 
there  is  a  wide  variety  of  situations  in  which 
exploitation alliances can provide firms with dis- 
tinctive   resources  considerations   in   the   short 
term  such  as  under  the  recession  conditions, 
where market selection pressures are less forgiv- ing 
than those in buoyant conditions. Our study extends  
this  line  of  research  by  uncovering  the 
exceptional short-term performance implications of 
exploitation alliances that can help contribute to  the  
firm’s  survival  in  the  wake  of  short-term shocks   
(Barker   and   Duhaime   1997;   Robbins and  
Pearce  1992).  More  specifically,  we  shed light  
on  this  critical  research  gap  by  providing the 
rationale with empirical evidence for a posi- tive  
relationship  between  exploitation  alliances and  
firm  survival  under  external  shocks.  Our finding 
suggests that engagement with exploita- tion  
alliances  enhances  a  start-up  biopharma- ceutical  
firm’s  chance  of  survival  under  sudden hostile 
external shocks. When faced with a sud- den   shock,   
entrepreneurs   must   react   quickly 
and  decisively  to  ensure  a  firm’s  continued  via- 
bility  because  implementing  small,  incremental 
changes,  even  in  large  numbers,  often  will  not 
produce  changes  necessary  to  adjust  to  new 
environmental realities (Romanelli and Tushman 
1985). 
Moreover, our study highlights differences in the 
extent to which each type of alliance affects firm 
survival under external shocks. Specifically, in its 
absolute magnitude, the effect of exploita- tion  
alliances  on  new  venture  failure  following the  
external  shock  is  much  greater  than  that  of 
exploration  alliances  (21.02  versus  0.02).  This 
suggests   that   short-term   shocks   catalyze   the 
value  of  exploitation  alliances  as  a  buffer  for 
survival. In contrast, the increased likelihood of 
failure   associated   with   exploration   alliances, 
though  relatively  small  in  magnitude,  is  much 
less sensitive to the  short-term shock. This sug- 
gests that in the aftermath of an external shock, 
survival is all down to whether a firm can latch on to 
the positive effect of exploitation alliances. 
Revenues  generated  through  exploitation  alli- 
ances can help new ventures to acquire valuable 
resources at bargain prices during the recession 
(Wan  and  Yiu  2009),  without  being  limited  by 
the   accompanying   funding   drought,   and   the 
high  interest  rates  charged  by  most  fund  pro- 
viders   to   compensate   for   greater   uncertainty 
(Storey  and  Greene  2010).  This  enables  these 
firms to capture the emerging opportunities cre- ated 
by external shocks faster and more aggres- sively  
(Hambrick  and  D’Aveni  1988;  Wan  and Yiu 
2009). 
Finally,  our  study  contributes  to  a  growing 
understanding of alliance ambidexterity and the 
conditions for such strategies to flourish. In line with 
the previous research on alliance ambidex- terity 
(Cao, Gedajlovic, and Zhang 2009; He and Wong  
2004;  Hill  and  Birkenshaw  2014),  our finding   
confirms   that   maintaining   a   balance between  
exploration  and  exploitation  alliance activities is of 
pivotal importance to a new ven- ture’s survival. The 
dangers that external shocks present  are  usually  
overlooked  in  the  light  of the   possible   
opportunities   they   create.   Prior work  on  the  
balance  between  exploration  and exploitation in 
alliance formation emphasizes its importance  on  
the  basis  of  ensuring  long-term survival  (Gupta,  
Smith,  and  Shalley  2006;  Hill and  Birkenshaw  
2014;  Lavie,  Kang,  and  Rose- nkopf 2011). Our 
study complements this body of  research  by  
underscoring  the  merits  of  bal- ancing   
exploration   and   exploitation   alliance activities   
in   contributing   to   firms’   short-term
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survival  under  sudden  hostile  shocks.  Previous 
literature  on  firm  performance  draws  a  clear line   
between  strategies  that  are  beneficial   to long-
term  performance  and  those  contribute  to short-
term  viability  (Levinthal  and  March  1993; March 
1991). Given that the long-term perform- ance 
contributions of balancing exploration and 
exploitation alliances are well documented (Hill and   
Birkenshaw   2014;   Lavie   and   Rosenkopf 
2011), we are able to demonstrate that there are 
strategies  that  can  help  not  only  sustain  the 
firm’s  performance  growth  but  also  contribute to 
its survival in the wake of short-term shocks. 
However,  our  analysis  further  suggests  that 
overdependence on either type of alliance activ- ity  
under  external  shocks  may  lead  a  new  ven- ture   
to   lose   either   its   continued   viability   or 
emerging   opportunities   that   could   potentially 
contribute  to  its  future  viability.  As  evidenced by 
our robustness check, alliance portfolio with a   
stronger  orientation   on   exploration   activity 
makes a new venture more vulnerable to short- term  
shocks.  Balancing  exploration  and  exploi- tation   
within   the   alliance   portfolio   therefore helps a 
new venture effectively tackle both sides of an 
external shock and enhances its chance of survival.  
From  an  organizational  learning  per- spective, to 
identify opportunities emerged from external  shocks  
with  the  potential  for  exploita- tion,  a  new  
venture  needs  to  possess  sufficient absorptive 
capacity to identify and evaluate new opportunities.  
The  foundations  for  these  activ- ities reside in the 
existing knowledge and com- petence  bases  which  
can  be  built  through  its exploration  alliance  
activity  (Hill  and  Birken- shaw   2014).   Likewise,   
a   number   of   studies show that the slack resources 
generated through engaging   in   exploitation   
alliance   activity   can provide  crucial  resources  
for  new  ventures  to better   capture   emerging   
opportunities   more aggressively  in  an  external  
shock  (Cheng  and Kesner 1997; Hambrick and 
D’Aveni 1988; Wan and Yiu 2009). 
Reflecting  further  on  our  results  opens  up 
research possibilities that we have not been able to  
explore  in  our data.  The  first research  possi- 
bility  relates  to  the  new  venture’s  exposure  to 
uncertainty   arising   from    a    partner’s    future 
behavior.  It  may  be  challenging  to  accommo- 
date  each  partner’s  internal  threat  rigidity  and 
failing to do so may hinder their joint response to   
increasing   environmental   threats   (Marino et  al.  
2002).  Over-relying  on  partners  may  lead to  
power  imbalance,  in  particular  when  a  new 
venture    collaborates    with    large    established 
firms.   It   is   likely   that   external   shocks   may 
amplify  a  new  venture’s  relational  risks  if  the 
firm is overly dependent on one or a set of part- 
ners,  who  fail  due  to  external  shocks.  Second, 
from  the  viewpoint  of  relational  capital,  in  the 
event  of  a  crisis  and  tightening  resources,  it  is 
questionable   whether   another   firm   is   really 
likely  to  make  available  its  limited  number  of 
resources  to  a  partner  firm  “instantly.”  These 
issues  raise  an  interesting  direction  for  future 
research to study alliance behaviors under exter- nal    
shocks    while    controlling    for    relational 
dependence,  power,  and  duration  of  the  rela- 
tionship up to the point of crisis. 
 
Limitations 
Our  study  is,  however,  subject  to  a  number 
of  limitations.  First  due  to  the  limitation  of  our 
data, we can only study exploration and exploi- 
tation  within  the  function  domain  of  alliance 
formation.  We  are  also  unable  to  identify  the 
length of each individual alliance, as it is possi- 
ble that some of the alliances are entered in the final 
stage when the survey was conducted and resolve 
before the external shock. Future studies should test 
the robustness of our findings across different 
domains of alliance formation, such as the  structure  
and  attribute  domains  while  con- trolling for the 
length of each alliance. 
Similarly,   we   measure   alliance   activity   by 
counting  exploration  and  exploitation  alliances, 
given  the  difficulties  of  measuring  the  value  of 
alliance  activity.  So  many  alliance  benefits  are 
indirect, what matters most may not be the bal- 
ance  between  direct  alliance  input  and  output 
but the impact of the alliance on the competitive 
standing   of   each   partner   and   the   strategic 
options  made  available  or  foreclose  (Doz  and 
Hamel   1998).   Therefore,   some   alliance   value 
can  be  measured  directly,  but  other  benefits may  
go  into  partners’  ledgers  in  a  furtive  man- ner.  
These  may  be  intangible  and  difficult  to link  
with  the  activities  of  the  alliance,  but  they are  
real  nevertheless  (Doz  and  Hamel  1998). Future  
research  should  attempt  to  go  beyond simple 
count measures to develop alliance activ- ity  
measures  that  reflect  its  quality  and  value more  
accurately.  More  in-depth  understanding of  value  
creation  and  value  appropriation  in strategic 
alliances is critical for developing meas- ures for the 
value of alliance activities. 
Second, our analysis is based on the biophar- 
maceutical sector, a sector that is often regarded as  
having  distinct  characteristics.  In  particular, our 
definition of new ventures as firms less than
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ten  years  old—may  not  be  compatitable  with 
new ventures in industries where the new prod- uct 
development and/or approval window is rel- atively   
short,   such   as   the   software   industry. 
Therefore,  before  attempting  wider  generaliza- 
tion, other studies could usefully be undertaken in  
an  attempt  to  generalize  our  results  to  other 
industries,  such  as  the  telecommunication  and 
semiconductor industries. Finally, further explo- 
ration of the positive impact of exploitation alli- 
ances  on  firm survival  is  clearly  needed,  as  our 
study  provides  little  insight  into  the  behavioral 
processes  underlying  this  effect  under  external 
shocks.    This    will    also    help    entrepreneurs 
enhance their strategic  planning  to prevent fail- ure   
in   the   event   of   sudden   hostile   external 
shocks. 
 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, this study represents a step in 
the   direction   of   acknowledging   “business   as 
usual” not as tucked away from the improbable 
extremities  of  a  normal  distribution  but  as  sub- 
ject to sizeable probability of short-term shocks. The  
natural  experiment  afforded  by  the  global 
financial  crisis  of  2008  enabled  us  to  examine 
how  the  strategic  choices  of  firms  in  2006— 
unsuspecting of what was to come—had signifi- cant  
consequences,  both  positive  and  negative, for firm 
survival in the wake of the crisis. It sug- gests  that  
theory  and  the  body  of  evidence  on the    
performance    consequences    of    strategic 
behaviors  should  be  sensitive  to  the  unknown but  
real  dangers  of  the  short-term.  In  specific, when 
prompt adaptation becomes unviable due to   the   
unknown   and   instant   nature   of   such shocks,   
it   is   likely   that   businesses   may   fail before  
even  realizing  their  arrival  and/or  possi- ble 
impact. To fully capture the opportunity and avoid  
the  dangers  external  shocks  present,  the 
occurrence  of  such  events  should  be  controlled 
in  the  evaluation  of  the  effectiveness  of  certain 
strategies before making a strategic choice. Our 
findings  suggest  that  exploration  alliances  with a 
long-term orientation make firms more vulner- able  
to  external  shocks,  whereas  exploitation alliances  
as  well  as  a  balance  between  explora- tion  and  
exploitation  alliances—which  underlie short-term  
performance—enable  these  firms  to sustain 
external shocks. 
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Appendix: Variable Table 
 
 
Variable name                                                                            Measurement 
 
No. of exploitation alliances    A firm’s number of marketing-based partnerships that focus on clinical 
trials, FDA regulatory process, marketing, and sales activities 
No. of exploration alliances     A firm’s number of R&D-based partnerships that focus on basic research, 
drug discovery, and preclinical development 
Alliance balance                         The multiplicative interaction of exploration and exploitation alliance 
activities divided by the average number of explora- 
tion/exploitation alliances 
Global financial crisis               A dummy variable reflecting the periods before and after Sep- tember 
2008 when the global financial crisis started 
Control variables 
R&D intensity                             R&D investment as a percentage of its total turnover 
No. of employees                      Number of full-time employees per firm 
Firm age (by 2006)                    Firm age measured in years 
Regional market                         Firms sell in regional market (Dummy) 
Foreign market                          Firms sell in foreign market (Dummy) 
External market                          Firms sell in external market (Dummy)
Primary activity: R&D and 
preclinical dev. 
Primary activity: marketing 
and sales 
Firms engage in R&D and preclinical development (Dummy) Firms 
engage in marketing and sales activities (Dummy)
Nationality                                   Firms that are originally from either the United States or Europe 
(Dummy) 
VC funding                                  Firms that received external funding from venture capitalists 
(Dummy) 
